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BOOK REVIEW 
STEVEN L. CHAN* 
THE RISE OF CHINA: HOW ECONOMIC REFORM IS CREAT-
ING A NEW SUPERPOWER. By WILLIAM H. OvERHOLT. New York, 
New York: W.W. Norton Be Co., Inc. 1993. Pp. 431. 
Since Deng Xiaopingl initiated economic reform in the People's 
Republic of China (China) in 1979, China has become one of the 
world's fastest growing economies.2 Considering that China bears the 
burden of 20 percent of the earth's population, its progress seems even 
more praiseworthy.3 Since economic reform on such a large scale was 
previously thought to be impossible for a country as large as China, 
William H. Overholt feels that its success merits Deng the recognition 
as one who has "done more to alleviate world poverty than any other 
man in world history."4 Deng and his reform coalition have incremen-
tally transformed China from a control to a market economy.5 This 
gradual shift has avoided the destructive side effects seen in Eastern 
European nations attempting the "big bang" method of immediate 
* Executive Book Review Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL 
I Deng has been the acknowledged leader of China since 1979 when he emerged with a 
dominant coalition of support within the Chinese Communist Party. See JONATHAN D. SPENCE, 
THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 653 (1990). He is one of the most reform-{)riented leaders 
among the Mao-era generation of leaders. See id. at 640-41. His views incorporate a limited 
opening of China to the West for economic and technical benefits. Id. 
2 WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, THE RISE OF CHINA: How ECONOMIC REFORM IS CREATING A NEW 
SUPERPOWER 27 (1993). 
3 See id. China's population is 1.2 billion people. Hamish McRae, China's Long March Towards 
Economy Class, THE INDEPENDENT, Feb. 1, 1994, at 17 (reviewing WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, THE 
RISE OF CHINA: How ECONOMIC REFORM IS CREATING A NEW SUPERPOWER (1993». Put in 
perspective, China's population is roughly equal to the combined population of the European 
Economic Community, the former Soviet Union, Africa, and South America. OVERHOLT, supra 
note 2, at 83. 
4 George Hicks, INT'L HERALD ThIB., Dec. 22, 1993 (reviewing WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, THE 
RISE OF CHINA: How ECONOMIC REFORM IS CREATING A NEW SUPERPOWER (1993» (quoting 
OVERHOLT), available in LEXIS, News Library, Current News File. In comparison, look at India 
with a population density similar to China. Yet, India continues to suffer from repeated economic 
failures. Overholt even makes the distinguishing analogy that India's failure resembles North 
Korea whereas China's success resembles South Korea. OVERHOLT, supra note 2, at 358-59. 
5 Joyce Barnathan, Letting China be China, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 7, 1994, at 15 (reviewing 
WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, THE RISE OF CHINA: How ECONOMIC REFORM IS CREATING A NEW 
SUPERPOWER (1993». 
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conversion.6 While significant controls still remain, there has been 
great progress with minimal harm to the population.7 Foreign trade 
has been liberalized,8 financial markets have been created,9 the gross 
national product (GNP) has grown exponentially,IO ties with neighbor-
ing nations have improved,l1 and arrangements have been made for 
the peaceful return of Hong Kong.12 
Overholt's book is a comprehensive examination of post-1979 
China from an economic perspective. It begins with a description of 
the transformation of China from a failed socialist-oriented control 
economy, comparing its progress to an array of other nations with 
similarly motivated modernization drives.13 Overholt then explains 
Deng's strategies of countering potentially threatening opposition with 
sustained efforts to "use the fruits of economic productivity to [ap-
pease] major sectors of the population."14 It is not surprising that 
Overholt, as a banker, briefly surveys the financial institutions and 
mechanisms necessary to establish an economy conducive to both 
domestic and foreign investors' needs.15 In addition, Overholt con-
ducts a case study of the most prosperous region under Deng's re-
forms, the Guangdong Province, which is advantageously situated ad-
jacent to Hong Kong.16 Overholt explains Guangdong's heavy 
interaction with Hong Kong as well as the ramifications of the 1997 
British transfer of Hong Kong back to Chinese sovereigntyP Finally, 
Overholt explores China's international goals and relations with other 
nations, particularly focusing on its relations with the United States.18 
Part I will begin with a survey of insightful observations made by 
Overholt based on his substantial experience with Asian issues. Over-
6 OVERHOLT, supra note 2, at 46. 
7 For example, China's gradual policy created rapid growth while keeping inflation under a 
tolerable 20 percent maximum as opposed to the 91 to 2,000 percent range encountered in 
Poland and the Soviet Union during their respective price liberalization efforts. Id. at 41-43. 
8Id. at 30. 
9 Id. at 45-46. 
10Id. at 29-30. 
11 Id. at 321-22. 
12Id. ch. V, at 249-312. 
13Id. at chs. I, II, 25-146. Overholt contrasts the Soviet Union's reform attempts under 
Gorbachev with Deng's reform methods, and likens Deng's reforms to those relatively successful 
ones made in the newly industrialized economies such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and 
South Korea. Id. at 32. 
14 Id. at 87. 
15Id. at ch. III, 147-82. 
16Id. at ch. IV, 183-248. 
17Id. at chs. IV, V, 183-312. 
18Id. at chs. VI, VII, 313-416. 
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holt takes some stances that might be considered controversial to other 
Asian observers. Part II looks at the most apparent dissimilarities be-
tween Overholt's beliefs and the general consensus on China. This Part 
reveals differences in Overholt's assumptions that perhaps explain the 
contrasting views. Part III concludes with a recommendation of how 
readers should approach The Rise of China: How Economic Reform zs 
Creating a New Superpower. 
1. THOUGHT-PROVOKING OBSERVATIONS OF CHINA 
China's dramatic economic progress is an extremely laudable ac-
complishment of which any nation would be proud. In fact, Overholt 
barely contains his enthusiasm in recounting the multiple instances of 
success. As managing director of Bankers Trust Company in the Hong 
Kong office since 1985, Overholt is well situated to intelligently assess 
China's business and political risks. 19 He has lectured and spoken to 
major regional government figures such as the Governor of Hong 
Kong, Chris Patten.20 In addition, he has studied under such renowned 
China and East Asian experts as Ezra Vogel at Harvard University and 
Herman Kahn at the Hudson Institute.21 He has advised Presidents 
Nixon and Carter on Asia and worked with Carter's National Security 
Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski.22 He has an enviable reputation for mak-
ing accurate predictions on Asian and Soviet affairs, often well before 
they become conventional wisdom.23 His analytical skills translated into 
savings of $150 million for his employer when he advised Bankers Trust 
to pull out of Poland just prior to its economic collapse in the early 
1980s.24 
Overholt's experience and knowledge have led to many thought-
ful and insightful observations on China's progress. For example, his 
19 See Sunny Goh, Optimistic Picture of China's Future, STRAITS TIMES, Dec. 11, 1993, at 39 
(reviewing WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, THE RISE OF CHINA: How ECONOMIC REFORM IS CREATING A 
NEW SUPERPOWER (1993». 
20 See OVERHOLT, supra note 2, at 288. 
21Id. at 417-18. 
22John Engen, Bankers Trust's Man in Hong Knng Sees China on Path to Prosperity, AM. 
BANKER,June 1, 1994, at 5. 
23 In the early 1970s, he predicted that the "rapid economic growth of smaller [Asian 
nations], if protected and nurtured, [would] save Asia from communism and change the world." 
OVERHOLT, supra note 2, at 420. Although this observation encountered ridicule at the time, the 
ensuing economic success of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Thailand 
solidified Overholt's reputation as an Asian specialist. His 1976 policy paper with Brzezinski 
predicting the downfall of the Soviet Union added to his credibility. See Engen, supra note 22, at 5. 
24 Engen, supra note 22, at 5. 
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advocacy of gradual reform by an authoritarian government seems 
credible given the success of role models such as Taiwan or South 
Korea. In addition, Overholt's disdain for a rapid conversion of China 
to a democracy and market economy seems well placed given the 
negative outcome of modern Russia, the Philippines, and Latin Amer-
ica.25 Deng's policy to reform China's control economy in incremental 
steps seems to have worked with minimal detractions. Beginning with 
large scale decollectivization, Deng's agricultural reform effort quickly 
improved economic conditions for the bulk of China's population-its 
800 million peasants.26 Deng then allowed the existence of small en-
trepreneurs.27 Finally, he promoted the heart of his reform strategy: 
seeking foreign investment and technology as a modernization strategy 
to allow China to catch up quickly to its more affluent neighbors.28 
Meanwhile, political liberalization, as a natural extension of eco-
nomic success, steadily progressed. Overholt suggests that China is on 
track to repeat the eventual evolution from an "authoritarian" regime 
to a democratic economic success as enjoyed by South Korea or Tai-
wan.29 In the interim, Overholt urges patience from China's critics; the 
long-term benefits will include political liberalization and will justify 
toleration of China's current human rights abuses.3o 
The proposition that China has forsaken geopolitical, ideological 
concerns and support of world insurrection in its single-minded quest 
for pragmatic economic success seems credible given the accompany-
ing statisticS.31 China's well-publicized arms sales to renegade nations 
25 Overholt's rationale is that democracy or a full market economy would not give an 
enlightened government the power needed to achieve substantive reforms. See OVERHOLT, supra 
note 2, at 122-23. A government requires strength to establish important measures such as vital 
institutions, a liberalized economy, and an educated middle<lass. Id. 
26 This effort generated large-scale increases in productivity and living standards. Barnathan, 
supra note 5, at 15. World Bank statistics demonstrate the magnitude of the reforms. Since 1978, 
a total of 170 million people have risen from absolute poverty, which is a 60 percent decline in 
the number of poor. Nicholas D. Kristof, Chinas Rush to Riches, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 4, 1994, 
at 46,54. 
27 Barnathan, supra note 5, at 15. 
28 See id. 
29 See OVERHOLT, supra note 2, at 100-01. Overholt cogently argues that the economic success 
in these countries has led to a peaceful transition to full democracy and that China is continuing 
in this pattern. Id. Political reforms often are not begun by shifts in government policies, but 
rather by the changes in social structure that accompany economic reform (e.g., increased 
expectations, disposable income, exposure to Western culture and ideas, and decentralization of 
decision-making).Id. at 137-39. 
30 See id. at 399-400. 
31 Military expenditure was reduced from lOA percent of gross national product at the 
beginning of Deng's reform in 1979 to 3.7 percent in 1989. In comparison, the United States 
spent about 6 percent of gross national product on the military throughout the 1980s. Id. at 340. 
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such as Iran and Syria are probably attributable more to the need for 
cash than to any sinister plot to destabilize the world.32 China's noto-
rious reputation as an arms exporter is distorted by the phenomenon 
that its customers buy from China only when other more modernly 
equipped nations will not sell. 33 Traditionally a strong champion of the 
"Third World movement," China has increasingly moderated its inter-
national rhetoric and efforts on behalf of these other countries.34 
Ironically, as China has deemphasized its geopolitical ambitions, its 
rising economic strength, accompanied by the relative decline of its 
neighbors, has accorded China "a geopolitical position superior to 
anything China has experienced in several centuries."35 This is partly 
due to the paradox of Asian development highlighted by Overholt: 
"[h]e who forgoes military ambitions gains in prosperity and power."36 
However, this phenomenon is assisted by the enormity of China's size. 
It has already become the third largest economy in the world, and the 
World Bank predicts it will undoubtedly surpass the United States and 
Japan to become the largest. 37 Needless to say, tremendous clout comes 
with this position. 
32 Overholt suggested that the United States should perhaps first scrutinize its own behavior 
before questioning Chinese arms sales. See id. at 370-71. Mter all, while the United States vocally 
complained about the sale of Chinese Silkworm missiles to Iran, it was itself secretly selling missiles 
to Iran. Id. Additionally, Third World arms transfer agreements in 1991 totalled $14.1 billion from 
the United States, but from China, only $300 million. Id. 
33Id. at 369. China's arms sales to Iran or Syria may appear particularly egregious. See id. at 
374. However, when considering the improved nature of the transferred technology, Western 
nations have also been guilty of similar, or perhaps worse practices. See id. Examples range from 
the French sale of nuclear technology to Pakistan to the German sale of chemical warfare 
technology to Libya. See id. 
34 Generally speaking, the Third World movement refers to the battle between the North and 
South countries, the rich versus the poor, and the developed nations against the developing 
nations. See id. at 332-37. China, with its communist radicalism and twenty percent of the world's 
population, was a significant ally of Third World "pauperism." Id. Its shift towards more pragmatic 
policies in 1979 decisively contributed to the declining strength of the Third World's moral, 
political, and economic arguments with respect to the Western developed nations. Id. at 336-37. 
Not only has China abandoned its support of Third World nations, but it has also abandoned its 
multi-faceted support of international revolutionary movements in countries such as Malaya, 
Thailand, the Philippines, Burma, Indonesia, and India. Id. at 322-23. 
As China becomes more prosperous, it has begun to share more common interests with 
developed nations, thus leaving its ideological brethren behind. See id. at 332-37. 
35Id. at 363. 
36Id. at 344. This paradox has already been demonstrated by Japan, Thailand, and South 
Korea. China has formidably solidified its power, such that "for the first time since before the 
Opium War, China faces no threat to its territorial integrity or national survival," and its interna-
tional influence continues to rise. Id. at 344-45. 
37 Kristof, supra note 26, at 54. Given the current statistics, it is not hard to envision China 
eventually surpassing the United States as the world's largest economy. McRae, supra note 3, at 
17. Its population is 1.2 billion, compared to the United States' 250 million, and the growth of 
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Overholt's argument in opposition to recurring United States' 
threats to deny the renewal of Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading 
status to China for human rights violations seems sensible. Denial of 
MFN is such a drastic action that it would effectively expel China from 
the free trade system.38 The harm to the United States economy would 
also be severe.39 With such serious repercussions, Overholt believes that 
the United States should not keep threatening China. Overholt ob-
serves that invocation of the MFN threat by successive American presi-
dents is more a function of domestic political posturing than a sub-
stantive policy rationale.40 As such, it is a hollow and ill-conceived threat 
that Overholt thinks is insulting and unnecessarily antagonistic to a 
country with the size and influence of China.41 Overholt feels it would 
even be counter-productive to the United States' goal of improved 
human rights, as it would reinforce the more conservative hardliners 
in China who would cite the revoking of MFN as yet another example 
that China should not be too open to the West. 42 The fact that only six 
out of 160 nations have been subjected to MFN revocation is indicative 
of its extremely rare use.43 
II. PROBLEMATIC FACETS OF DEVELOPMENT 
Overholt takes such a positive view of China's successes and eco-
nomic efforts that important concerns are either down played or ig-
its GNP has averaged ten percent per annum for the last ten years, compared to the United States 
at three percent. Id. The World Bank estimated that Greater China (an area that includes China, 
Taiwan, and Hong Kong) will have a gross domestic product of $9.8 trillion in 2002, compared 
to $9.7 trillion for the United States in the same year. Kristof, supra note 26, at 54. 
38 OVERHOLT, supra note 2, at 391-92. Overholt believes the repercussions would not be 
serious for most of China because so much of it is not dependent on foreign exports. See id. It 
would be primarily the export-oriented regions such as the Guangdong and Fujian Provinces that 
would be especially hit hard. See id. Additionally, losses might be greatest in dependent Hong 
Kong (estimated to be $2,000 for each of its six million residents), and Taiwan, due to its 
utilization of China as a manufacturing platform. Id. at 392. In the period between 1979 and 
1992, Hong Kong and Taiwan accounted for 57 percent of the foreign investment in the 
Guangdong Province, with 11 percent from Japan and 9 percent from the United States. Hong 
Kong-Investment Gateway to China, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 1994, at S2. 
39 OVERHOLT, supra note 2, at 393-94. Since MFN is reciprocal, the loss of United States 
exports to China would result in a loss of over 100,000 United States export-oriented jobs. Id. at 
394. Additionally, the credibility of United States world leadership would be severely tested, as 
no other Western nation would follow the United States' isolation of China. Id. at 393. 
40 Id. at 398. In a speech at the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, Overholt stated: 
"[the United States] never want[s] to take away MFN. They just want to threaten. They think they 
will get a lot by threatening." Market Spotlight: Nikkei Ahead After Fears of Plunge Fade, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Nov. 17, 1993, at 10. 
41 See OVERHOLT, supra note 2, at 390-98. 
42 Engen, supra note 22, at 5. 
43 The six nations that have been deprived of MFN status are members of an international 
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nored. One cntIc noted, "Overholt's book elevates the notion that 
stability, economic development and business profits should always 
take precedence over personal freedom."44 So long as economic re-
forms continue to succeed, Overholt discounts or rationalizes as sec-
ondary other seemingly significant problems. Not since John Fair-
bank's glossing of the Cultural Revolution in 1972 has there been such 
an unabashedly optimistic writing about China.45 Apparently not wish-
ing to dampen the reader's excitement over China's economic accom-
plishments, Overholt takes a decidedly pro-Deng stance.46 
Moreover, any intelligent discussion of modern China cannot oc-
cur without at least some recognition of the enormous impact of the 
Tiananmen Square incident. Overholt, however, does not accord the 
Tiananmen incident its historical impact, dismissing it as " ... a minor 
bump in the road toward prosperity and, eventually, democracy. "47 Yet, 
Tiananmen was a culmination of existing problems with China's ruling 
system.48 It was a watershed event that drastically impaired the image 
of China's government in the eyes of China's people and the interna-
tional community.49 By de-emphasizing the root causes that led to 
Tiananmen, Overholt inadequately addresses systemic problems that 
persist in China. 50 
The importance of the Tiananmen Square incident merits a brief 
description. The event occurred on June 4, 1989 in Tiananmen 
Square, Beijing, when an estimated 700 student demonstrators were 
callously killed by well-armed soldiers of the Chinese Army.51 The 
demonstrators were advocating greater freedom of expression to en-
outlaw community to which China clearly does not belong. OVERHOLT, supra note 2, at 391. As 
of 1992, they were: Cambodia, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, Romania, and Vietnam. Id. 
44 Hicks, supra note 4. 
45 See, e.g. Hicks, supra note 4; Jonathan Spence, From Stone Age to Tiananmen Square, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 24, 1992, § 7, at 2 (reviewing JOHN FAIRBANKS, CHINA: A NEW HISTORY (1992» 
(Fairbanks was quoted as saying the Maoist Revolution is on the whole the best thing that 
happened to the Chinese people in many centuries). 
46 One critic, George Hicks, even likens Overholt's book to being a better written version of 
an official account by the Chinese government. Hicks, supra note 4. He argues that Overholt goes 
beyond the 'usual pro-Beijing line taken by Hong Kong big business and China traders ... [for 
at least they] preserve[d] a modicum of cynicism." Id. 
47 Arnold R. Isaacs, China Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1993, § 7, at 23 (reviewing WILLIAM H. 
OVERHOLT, THE RISE OF CHINA: How ECONOMIC REFORM IS CREATING A NEW SUPERPOWER 
(1993». 
46 See generally Gerrit W. Gong, Tiananmen: Causes and Consequences, 13 WASH Q. 79, 84 
(1989). 
49Id. 
50 The following concerns are examples of neglected issues: nationalism, self-determination, 
protectionism, succession struggle, rising inequality, and trade antagonisms. Id. 
51 SPENCE, supra note 1, at 742-43. 
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able economic and scientific progress for the country as a whole.52 
These abstract demands for democracy were rooted in widespread 
disenchantment with the structure of the current economic reforms.53 
Three primary issues were at the core of the students' complaints: 1) 
the ability to choose their jobs rather than following government 
dictates, 2) the widespread corruption and nepotism of government 
and party bureaucrats, and 3) the high rate of inflation that seriously 
eroded buying power. 54 Overholt acknowledges the existence of these 
serious problems but does not seem to place as much emphasis on 
their resolution as do the Chinese people. In addition, the Chinese 
government's repressive response at Tiananmen signified the Chinese 
leadership's belief that: 
economic reforms could be completely divorced from the 
immensely complex social and cultural effects that the re-
forms brought in their train ... [threatening] to commit the 
government again to the nineteenth-century fallacy that 
China could join the modern world entirely on its own terms, 
sacrificing nothing of its prevailing ideological purity. 55 
Five years after Tiananmen, the structural problems that sparked 
it still continue and arguably have worsened. Job opportunities are 
uneven and regionally determined, corruption and nepotism have 
worsened, and inflationary cycles continue to persist.56 The rural and 
urban disparity continues as the country lacks the investment to cor-
rect the imbalance.57 The future prospect of massive unemployment 
appears unavoidable as Deng must eventually overhaul the extremely 
inefficient state operations which account for 150 million redundant 
workers and the 50 million more anticipated by the end of the cen-
tury.58 Corruption, kickbacks and graft have spread to officials at all 
levels to such an extent that foreign businesses recognize it to be a 
standard cost of doing business in China. 59 Those that were the targets 
52 Id. at 738. 
53 See id. at 733-37. 
54 See id. 
55 Id. at 745-46. 
56 See Richard Homik, The Middle Kingdom? Bursting China's Bubble, 73 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
May:June 1994, at 28, 31-37. 
57 See id. at 35-36. In 1993, farmers' net income was $87 while it was $204 for urban workers. 
Id. Agricultural output only grew four percent as industrial output grew twenty percent. Id. 
58 See id. 
59 Catherine Field, Spirit of the Wild West Lives on in the Shimmering East, THE TIMES 
(London), Aug. 23, 1994, at 25. Within the first four months of 1994, there were 19,000 economic 
crimes which included 12,000 bribery and corruption cases. Id. Liang Guoqing, deputy procura-
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of the student protestors' charges of nepotism during Tiananmen have 
become China's new aristocracy, often referred to as the "red princes 
or princesses," or the "princelings."60 They are the middle-aged sons 
and daughters of China's octogenarian ruling generation.6l They have 
used their social connections and status to prosper disproportionately 
under China's economic reforms.62 They are the ones with an interest 
in a loose monetary system.63 Partly due to their influence and also due 
to the central government's inability to control the various provincial 
governments, China is unable to impose fiscal and monetary discipline 
in a consistent manner.54 Thus, the cycles of inflation continue, the 
budget deficit grows exponentially, and capital flight worsens.65 
While Overholt recognizes the harmfulness of these sobering 
trends, he seems to downplay their effect more than other experts. He 
disputes the 200 million underemployed or unemployed figure as 
unreliable and presents a different view to explain the numbers.66 He 
acknowledges that the inefficient state sector accounts for huge 
deficits, but advocates only gradual privatization because he believes 
that the disruption that would undoubtedly accompany an abrupt 
conversion would be much worse.67 He down plays the effects associated 
with the cycles of inflation.68 Regarding the influence of the "princel-
tor-general said, "[officials] use their power to blackmail, demand bribes, embezzle and pursue 
private interests." Id. 
60 Field, supra note 59, at 25; Peter Goodspeed, China's 'Princelings' the New Hong Kong Elite 
Children, Relatives of Chinese Officials Control the Tap Jobs, TORONTO STAR, June 12, 1994, at C5. 
61 Goodspeed, supra note 60, at C5. 
62 Id. These "princelings" represent the most public intertwining of political power and 
economic interests as they are highly sought after by foreign businesses hoping to benefit from 
their connections. See id. A Hong Kong periodical claims a secret Chinese report estimates that 
the children or close relatives of 1,700 top Chinese officials control 3,100 of China's top govern-
ment and military positions with an additional 900 close relatives operating China's major trading 
companies. Id. 
63 See Hornik, supra note 56, at 29-30. 
64 See id. 
65 See id. at 30-35. China's Finance Ministry projects the 1994 budget deficit to triple to $7.7 
billion while others estimate it to be $14.8 billion. Id. at 31. Inflation averaged 30 percent in 
urban areas. Id. at 36. A large percentage of the profits made by the "princelings" and others are 
being invested outside of China, with well over $1 billion being spent on Hong Kong real estate 
alone. See id. at 33. 
66 See OVERHOLT, supra note 2, at 76--79. Overholt claims that policies founded on socialism 
and protectionism foster large bureaucracies that are actually disguised unemployment because 
each firm becomes a miniature welfare state. Id. He states that Deng's reforms are ironic in that 
they have exposed and focused negative attention on this disguised unemployment, but at the 
same time the growing economy has accounted for an increase in employment coupled with a 
higher standard of living. Id. 
67 Id. at 64. 
68 Id. at 60-62. 
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ings" and the general atmosphere of corruption, Overholt believes that 
it is simply a phase that will pass.69 
Overholt continues to profess that China will eventually become 
democratic despite the lack of active efforts by the Chinese govern-
ment to make this a reality.70 Given China's relatively large size, Over-
holt's theory of eventual political liberalization akin to Taiwan or South 
Korea appears misguided. 71 Even after Tiananmen demonstrated the 
Communist Party's clear willingness to use force to preserve its power, 
Overholt continues to maintain that the Communist Party is only a 
temporary, albeit necessary, phenomenon.72 
Overholt's comparison of China to smaller Asian countries such 
as Taiwan or South Korea also proves inadequate when assessing the 
viability of economic reforms. Most small Asian countries, including 
Japan, achieved economic success with military or historical links to 
either the United States or Britain.73 This protective security was com-
plemented by an export strategy to the waiting markets of their recep-
tive benefactors.74 There are three primary bases for distinguishing 
China. First, the Chinese economy is so immense that other countries 
cannot absorb the amount of potential goods that it could produce; 
thus, its "economic expansion will have to be internally driven, and 
will almost certainly move more slowly as a result. "75 Second, since 
strategic reasons motivated the West's prior boosting of other Asian 
nations, Western markets are certainly not as receptive to an "inde-
pendent" China's products or its unfair trade practices.76 Third, while 
69Id. at 80-81. Overholt further contends that other economically successful Asian nations, 
such as South Korea and Taiwan, passed this phase and that market economic efficiency theory 
dictates that corruption cannot go on indefinitely. Id. He believes China's "princelings" are not 
nearly as bad as the friends and relatives of the Marcos family or the Suharto family, in the 
Philippines and Indonesia respectively, each of which had gained family monopolies of their 
nation's major enterprises. See id. at 81. 
70 See id. at 399-400. 
71 It is not difficult to see that in a country of 1.2 billion people, the demonstrations of 
thousands of students in Beijing would affect the rest of China relatively less than a similar student 
demonstration in Seoul might affect the rest of Korea with its population of only 43 million. See 
McRae, supra note 3, at 17. In South Korea, demonstrations have occurred consistently since 
1960, resulting in the government's eventual democratization. However, the Chinese government 
has quickly crushed major demonstrations and restricted information disseminated to the outer 
provinces. See SPENCE, supra note 1, at 743 (noting in the wake of Tiananmen, the government 
quickly cut off the flow of information, both domestically and internationally). 
72 Isaacs, supra note 47, at 23. 
73 McRae, supra note 3, at 17. 
74Id. 
75Id. 
76Id. See Louis Kraar, Big Dreamers and Wild Schemers, FORTUNE, Dec. 13, 1993, at 190 
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other Asian countries have managed to raise the living standards of 
their people with rough economic parity, China has shown much 
greater polarization.77 
Similarly, Overholt enjoys comparing and upholding the supe-
riority of China's reform efforts to the Gorbachev-type reforms in the 
Soviet Union or the "big bang" approach taken in post-communist 
Eastern Europe.78 Such a comparison is premature and fails to high-
light important differences between these nations. Gorbachev, as Over-
holt implies, never had Deng's institutional support, control, or credi-
bility.79 Unlike China, the Soviet Union was primarilyurban.80 Although 
Gorbachev failed with agricultural initiatives, it was actually his inability 
to reform the massive state industries that led to his undoing.81 Des-
peration drove him to attempt political liberalization before funda-
mental economic reform.82 Meanwhile in China, Deng's successful 
reform of the countryside appeased 800 million of China's 1.2 billion 
people.83 Contrary to conventional wisdom, China still has not under-
taken the reform of the massive and inefficient state industries that led 
to Gorbachev's undoing.84 Therefore, despite Overholt's repeated 
praise for China's efforts, perhaps his praise should be reserved until 
China successfully undertakes major structural reform. Meanwhile, in 
order to stay operational, China's state enterprises continue to require 
large governmental subsidies.85 
NEW SUPERPOWER (1993». China will need other countries to be receptive to its products. This 
means that it will have to balance its objectives with reasonable demands of other nations. Charles 
Powell, The Next Great Marketplace? Charles Powell on the Implications of China's Booming Economy, 
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 16, 1994, at 11 (reviewing WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, THE RISE OF CHINA: 
How ECONOMIC REFORM IS CREATING A NEW SUPERPOWER (1993». 
77 Isaacs, supra note 47, at 23. In general, the coastal areas have benefited over the interior 
regions, the South has grown more than the North, and individually there has been great disparity 
in economic success. Raw economic data indicate this disparity: 520 of China's 1,903 counties 
have an annual income of below $35 per capita, as compared with a national average estimated 
at $1,500 to $1,800 per capita, per year; per capita GNP ranges from a high of$519 in Guangdong 
Province to only $164 in Guizhou Province; and personal accounts of individuals with outrageous 
wealth exist in sharp contrast to the many government workers on fixed salaries. OVERHOLT, 
supra note 2, at 26, 52, 90, 103. 
78 See OVERHOLT, supra note 2, at 32-34, 46. 
79 Barnathan, supra note 5, at 15. 
80Id. 
81Id. 
82Id. 
83Id. 
84 See id. 
85Id. As of 1992, the state sector employed 75 percent of China's urban labor force but 
accounted for only 50 percent of China's industrial production. Gerrit W. Gong, China's Fourth 
Revolution, 17 WASH. Q. 29, 34 (1994). Such a disparity indicated severe under-employment. 
Although losses that these enterprises absorb are hidden and understated, the general consensus 
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A final criticism of Overholt's book focuses on his assertion that 
the emerging winners of a post-Deng succession struggle for leadership 
would be authoritarian modernizers (such as the followers of Zhao 
Ziyang and Hu Yaobang) ,86 rather than the bureaucratic socialists led 
by current Premier Li Ping and President Jiang Zemin, Deng's desig-
nated successor.87 To most observers, however, this result is not as clear 
as Overholt implies.88 Not only is the Zhao faction currently in official 
disrepute and the Li faction unpopular with the people due to their 
role in the Tiananmen Square crackdown, but there remain two figures 
from Deng's generation who exude tremendous influence.89 If the 
currently favored Li or Jiang gain control, they will continue reforms 
but it will be at a slower pace than Zhao or even Deng would prefer.90 
Considering Li's role in crushing the Tiananmen demonstrations, his 
control would probably delay the achievement of the political free-
doms that Overholt predicted. Moreover, there is always the probability 
that the Maoist radicals that caused the destructive Cultural Revolution 
could regain some modicum of influence, despite Overholt's cursory 
dismissals to the contrary. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Overholt has written an enormously well-contemplated and inter-
esting account of the rise of modern China. He makes insightful 
observations that capture many relevant aspects of the fifteen-year 
period of Deng's ambitious reforms. He demonstrates an almost intui-
is that one-third of China's 10,000 state companies were profitable, one-third were border-line 
insolvent, and one-third suffered from large hidden losses. Id. 
86 See OVERHOLT, supra note 2, at 91-102. Aside from Zhao, often grouped within this 
moderate category are Wan Li, a former parliamentary chief and Qiao Shi, a former security 
chief who now heads the National People's Congress. Patrick E. Tyler, In the Twilight of Deng, 
China's Rising Stars Jostle, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,1994, § I, at 3. 
87 OVERHOLT, supra note 2, at 98; Tyler, supra note 86, at 3. The fact that Jiang is currently 
Deng's chosen heir is not as defining as it would seem given that Mao's designated successor, 
Hua Guofang, was overthrown by a then disfavored Deng in less than three years in December 
1978. SPENCE, supra note I, at 675--77. 
88 See, e.g., Tyler, supra note 86, at 3; Isaacs, supra note 47, at 23. This is especially true, 
considering both Zhao and Hu were put into official disfavor for their encouraging of the 
students' call for democracy and advocating reform at a pace that raised the risk of inflation, 
social ferment, and ideological heresy. See OVERHOLT, supra note 2, at 97-98. 
89 Tyler, supra note 86, at 3. One, Chen Yun, an economist, is anti-American and would 
undoubtedly align with the Li or Jiang faction. The other is Yang Shangkun, who is relatively 
more reform oriented and pro-American. Id. 
90Id. In early 1992, Deng challenged Li's plan for 6 percent growth as inadequate and called 
for a 10 percent plan. Id. While Deng retains influence now, he has just turned ninety-years-old 
in August 1994; once he dies, there will be no one of his stature to prompt Li to quicken reform. 
See id. 
1995) BOOK REVIEW 223 
tive ability to decipher the critical phases of China's reform, both 
domestically and as it affects the international community. His section 
outlining the macro-economic requirements for reform such as the 
development of capital markets is informative for readers who may lack 
his banking background. The recounting of key details of the transfer 
of Hong Kong and the post-agreement political posturing by both the 
British and Chinese gives the reader an "insider view" of the process. 
His summation with an overview of United States-China relations ech-
oes the book's pervasive message that China has indeed become a 
world force to be reckoned with on equal terms. 
However, some of Overholt's observations are phrased in such a 
pro-China tone that they do not give an otherwise uninformed reader 
an objective view of China's reforms. The topic that Overholt addresses 
is so complex that it invariably requires heavy editing to distill it to an 
understandable medium. Perhaps due to this effort to condense and 
convey the subject matter, Overholt makes some rather broad asser-
tions and weak analogies that are at best misleading, and at worst 
inaccurate. While Overholt remains extremely optimistic about the 
future course of China's economic modernization goals and eventual 
political reform, most expert observers are far more cautious. Then 
again, Overholt has an unblemished track record for making bold 
predictions that are contrary to conventional wisdom. Nevertheless, 
Overholt's account of China's reforms probably should be read with a 
more critical eye toward China than is presented by the author, in the 
event that his rosy predictions do not materialize. 



